SignWhateverSign in

Security

Updated 28 September 2026

What we do today, described plainly. We don’t hold security certifications, and we won’t imply we do.

Signing

  • Recipients don’t need an account. Before a document opens, they confirm their email address with a one-time code that expires in 10 minutes and stops working after 5 wrong tries.
  • Links in emails carry a random secret in the part of the address that browsers never send to servers, so it stays out of server logs. We store only a keyed hash of it.
  • Signing binds to one exact, frozen version of the documents. If the sender cancels or changes anything, earlier sessions stop working.

Evidence

  • Every material step is recorded in an append-only log. Each entry includes the fingerprint (SHA-256) of the one before it, so edits, deletions and reordering are detectable.
  • Completed documents are sealed with SignWhatever’s own certificate. That certificate isn’t on Adobe’s trust list, so PDF readers show it as unverified, but any change to the file still breaks the seal.
  • Each agreement comes with an evidence package: the documents, a completion certificate, the event log and a manifest signed with a published Ed25519 key. Anyone can check it at /verify; the check runs in the browser.

What email verification does and doesn’t prove

A one-time code shows that someone controlled the recipient’s mailbox when they signed. It doesn’t verify government identity or that the person has authority to sign for a company. Stronger checks (SMS, ID verification, qualified signatures) aren’t offered yet.

Infrastructure

  • Documents are stored privately and are only served to people allowed to see them, through short checks on every request.
  • Data is hosted in the United States (Vercel, Neon Postgres, Vercel Blob). Email is sent through Resend.
  • No advertising or session-replay scripts run on signing pages.